Liquidity is one of the most important factors after credit risk that affects the bond yields. The paper uses various measures of liquidity to understand their determinants in Indian sovereign bond market. The Liquidity measured by parameters like Turnover Ratio and Amihud Illiquidity Indicator show that these parameters not only have instantaneous relationship with bond yield but contemporaneous relationship with themselves. Impact Cost is not found to have any explanatory power. Financial crisis had marginal impact on the Indian sovereign bond market. It functioned well during the crisis period without much deterioration in general market liquidity condition as RBI injected large amount of liquidity to the system within a limited time period to ensure stability in the financial markets in India. However, the notion of flight to safety was evident as traders started investing largely in Government bonds shunning credit products as the credit quality in general started to dip. This was duly supported by large issuances of Government bonds. The study also finds that the electronic order matching system for government bonds has been successful in improving liquidity and reducing volatility in the market.
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Liquidity is a major issue in bond markets in emerging countries like India. Corporate bond markets suffer from higher level of illiquidity vis-à-vis Government bond market in emerging market economies. Liquidity may have many different things for interpretation. For financial market, we generally define liquidity as the ease of trading a financial product. If the trading results in substantial value loss for the asset vis-à-vis its intrinsic value, then we consider the market for the security as illiquid. If the price loss is marginal or negligible, we consider the market for the product as liquid. There are many measures of liquidity -volume traded, number of trades, frequency of trades, bid-ask spread, transaction-by-transaction market impact, etc.
However, finer liquidity estimation using some of these concepts will require high frequency microstructure data that may not be easily available. Hence, we need to use some simple concept to measure liquidity over a long period of time.
There are several factors that affect the liquidity -information availability, reliability and quality of transaction costs, price impact, and search costs, among others. Liquidity affects the asset prices as investors would require additional compensation to have the inventory of the illiquid assets which have higher transaction cost vis-à-vis a liquid asset. Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1989) have demonstrated that lower liquidity in assets resulted in significantly higher average returns, after controlling for risk and other factors.
The current study examines the liquidity of the Government securities market in India. The Government securities market is viewed as one of the most important financial market as it links economic activity to interest rate. Central banks use the market to perform domestic monetary operations like infusing liquidity to the system or absorbing excess liquidity in the system through Repo windows or Open Market Operations (OMO). They use the market to extract information on forward interest rates and inflation expectations. The market also provides benchmarks to the traders to use it for corporate credit. Liquidity of this market is important to all stake holders. The market liquidity has an impact on a central bank's policy making specifically when the central bank has additional responsibility of ensuring the smooth borrowing programme for the Government. There are three distinct channels through which we can study this impact. (a) Liquidity has an impact on monetary policy formulation of the central bank as the decision to follow a tight or easy monetary policy depends on the available liquidity in the system. Financial asset price information (Bond prices) provide valuable clue not only on current market condition, they also provide vital information on future monetary conditions and hence this can be used in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy by the central bank. Market liquidity affects price of assets as illiquid securities add significant cost of holding an asset inventory to its price. As liquidity has cost, its gets built into the price. Liquidity condition in the market also affects the transmission of monetary policy actions. Central Banks conduct OMO to easy liquidity condition in the market so that the interest rate is moderated to targeted levels. Market liquidity has a more direct impact on monetary policy implementation.
(b) Market liquidity may at times cause systemic disruption and put pressure on Governments and central banks to act. Financial crisis of 2007-09 was accentuated more due to tight market liquidity as funds dried up in the market and many firms had to face liquidation as they did not have sufficient liquidity options to survive the tight condition. Depending on the level of market liquidity, at times, liquidity issues give rise to solvency problems at key financial intermediaries.
The liquidity problems can lead to systemic failure in payment systems (liquidity risk) and lead to the collapse in credit allocation. During recent financial crisis, most of the central banks around the world worked overtime to inject liquidity to the financial system through banking and near-banking channels to avoid systemic payment collapse. Hence, insufficient market liquidity will have resultant impact on a central bank's activities both as a lender of last resort and in its supervision of financial stability. An inadequate liquidity situation may lead to inaccurate estimation of market risk and may create disruption in the market discipline posing serious challenge to the central bank's ability to supervise through prudential regulation. (c) In the aftermath of financial crisis, it was observed that most of the Governments around the world have very high level of outstanding debt because of their support to the financial system during the crisis and after. A liquid secondary market results in lower borrowing cost for the Governments. A central bank would always work in close coordination with the Government to enhance the integrity and efficiency of the Government securities market. Central banks around the world released funds to the monetary system by following easy monetary policy regimes so that transmission effect results in smooth credit and market risk environment and to obviate bankruptcy issues. Most of the central banks used bond buying programmes to pump liquidity to support the market.
A market is liquid if traders can execute their trades immediately, and where large deals have little impact on current and subsequent prices or bid-ask spreads. The market liquidity is better explained over four dimensions: immediacy, depth, width (bid-ask spread), and resiliency. All these dimensions of liquidity interact with each other and makes market liquidity a complex issue. A market is generally considered to be liquid if it is possible for a trader to sell or buy large amounts of securities in a minimum number of transactions with little impact on prices.
Gravelle (1999a) explained liquidity according to four dimensions: (a) immediacy, or the speed of doing a transaction; (b) depth, which refers to the maximum amount of a security which can be traded at a given price; (c) width, or the bid-ask spread 3 , which is the cost of accessing liquidity indicating a wider spread means lower liquidity; and (d) resiliency, which captures how fast prices revert to their equilibrium after a transaction.
Price impact explains the depth of the market. In a liquid market, large quantities of securities can be traded without affecting the price. But in many markets -specifically in emerging markets, it might be difficult to find a counterparty who is willing to buy or sell a specific security and the holder of the bond need to provide higher capital to maintain the inventory. The liquidity of a specific bond may affect the price. If the investor wants an immediate execution of a sell order, he will have either to sell at a discount, or take the risk of waiting to realize the price. Liquidity is an important determinant of bond yield and returns. The liquidity component of bonds can explain a larger fraction of the yield than the default component itself. The size and the turnover volume of the secondary market affect the liquidity of the bonds. If a market has sufficient buyers and sellers to facilitate trading of a bond, its ability to respond to market events is higher. Illiquid bonds respond less quickly to market events due to low depth and hence they are more likely to see wide swings in prices. The traders will penalize higher volatility and demand high yield which will be reflected in the bond's price. India, the experiment with the NDS-OM 4 trading system for Government bonds has paid rich dividend for all stake holders. However, market participants still preferred using conventional trading channel for off-the-run bonds and other sovereign securities like T-bills and State Development Loans 5 (SDL) even though NDS-OM provides better electronic order book options. In most countries, liquid secondary markets are based on the following cornerstones: (i)
higher incidence of issuance in critical tenors like benchmark points; (ii) well-functioning repo and short sell markets; (iii) well-functioning derivatives (both OTC and exchange traded) markets to hedge risks; (iv) facilitating price discovery mechanism; and (v) supporting a network of primary dealers.
The concept of liquidity is complex, although empirically, a single dimension such the ability to trade a security with minimal impact on its price is considered while measuring liquidity in quantitative terms. The liquidity in Indian Government bond market could be enhanced to some extent in recent years by using the key building-blocks like: (i) sound institutions and macro policies; (ii) an efficient and robust infrastructure; (iii) a well-functioning repo market; (iv) adequate information flows; and (v) a diversified investor base including facilitating foreign investment in Government bonds.
Indian Treasury bond market has gone through major changes during last one decade or so.
Introduction of primary dealer system, well-structured auction mechanism with auction calendar, structured clearing and settlement mechanism with CCP 6 provisions, availability of OTC Rupee derivatives products, anonymous trading platform like NDS-OM providing efficient price discovery, well developed repo and repo-variant market 7 , provisions of short selling, etc. have been instrumental in improving the market microstructure in Indian Government bond market.
The Government bond market is a unique experiment with enabling provisions for execution of trades using brokers, directly talking to a counter party over telephone and online anonymous order matching mechanism.
The present paper makes an attempt to understand the issues related to liquidity behavior of Indian Government securities market as well as tries to find out how various indicators of liquidity is used in the market. It also tries to understand how realistically the liquidity indicators are used in the market and what factors are considered as determinants of the liquidity indicators.
The paper is arranged into following -Section 1 deals with Indian market microstructure; Section 2 discusses some stylized facts; Section 3 deals in liquidity measurement and determinants; Section 4 deals with volatilities and Section 5 gives concluding remarks.
Indian Market Microstructure
Indian bond market is dominated by Government securities -in both primary and secondary markets. Government bond market includes the securities issued not only by the Government of India 8 but also the securities issued by various federal States. The primary market auctions for both Government securities and Treasury Bills are conducted through electronic auction system and the said system also facilitates "When Issued Market". # -Transaction on CCIL comprises of total outright and repo value settled.
@ -Last trading day of the financial year.
$ -Last Auction of the financial year. Turnover ratio is daily average trades volume divided by Face Value outstanding for Gilts Source: CCIL During last few years, Government of India has been steadily increasing its market borrowing and funds almost 90% of its fiscal deficit through such market borrowings. In FY2011-12, large amount were raised by issuing T-bills of various durations. During FY2011-11 and FY2011-12, some Cash Management Bills 10 were also issued to raise funds from the system. As these large borrowings have put pressure in the market liquidity, RBI has to resort to Open Market Operations (OMO) on various occasions to infuse liquidity to the system. This liquidity infusion is in addition to the daily LAF Repo conducted by RBI to moderate money supply in the system. The web-based application within NDS-OM system allows direct market access to constituents to trade in the wholesale institutional market with efficient price discovery. The participants had three options to choose: (a) directly negotiating with each other for a deal; (b) taking the help of a broker to identify the counter party to trade a security; (c) directly becoming a member of the 11 1 crore is equivalent to 10 million. 12 An electronic demat account maintained by an investor with a service provider like a bank to hold the balances of Government securities once purchased.
new order driven system which was STP 13 enabled from the start. However, the new system captured about 60% of the market immediately after its introduction. The market share of the new trading system is steady at about 80%. Broking companies have very little role with about 8% market share.
The new trading system, NDS-OM, provided higher liquidity to the system with an active order book management system and efficiency in price discovery. 13 Straight Through Processing (STP) -a process through which a trade executed in the NDS-OM system will directly go for multilateral netting through the clearing house and final settlement in central bank money. Other deals have to be reported to RBI within a certain prescribed time after execution. Broker driven deals have to be reported by selling Bank to the RBI and Broker has also to report the same deal to the Stock Exchange. 14 `1crore is equivalent of 10million.
companies account for about 9% of trading. Indian Government bond market is divided into two distinct systems -(i) an anonymous order driven system (NDS-OM) introduced in Aug 2005 and
(ii) a trade reporting system where trades are executed over phone by market participants and then reported to the central server managed by Reserve Bank of India (RBI) within a particular time frame (30 minutes) 16 . Market participants, mainly institutions, are free to choose any of the above two systems for their deals in Government securities and T-bills. The NDS-OM system contributes a significant part of the market transactions in number of deals as well in terms of value of deals and has established itself as the most preferred platform for executing trades. 
Some Stylized Facts Liquidity Infusion
Liquidity in the market depends on many factors. The most important issue in liquidity is the support from the central bank to the banking system to access liquidity from the monetary system. RBI uses daily Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) to moderate money supply in the system -if the banking system has excess liquidity, it can be parked at the central bank with a fixed return using policy reverse repo rate through LAF and if the banking system faces shortage of liquidity, RBI injects liquidity to the system using a fixed policy repo rate through LAF. In case the bank is not able to cover its position and still faces shortage, RBI supports the bank with a Marginal Standing Facility using a special LAF window at the end of the business day. The net LAF indicates the liquidity condition in the market. During financial crisis period, we find that liquidity shortage in the market resulted in RBI injecting funds to the system in mid-2008 and in 15 As of Dec'12 statistics. 16 Since April'13, all OTC deals executed by market participants need to be reported to the NDS-OM system.
Sep-Oct'08, the shortage was more than 1% of the NDTL. Further, in order to fight the effect of the financial crisis, RBI reduced the policy Repo Rate on multiple occasions, reduced CRR and SLR and infused liquidity in the system. This substantial injection of liquidity resulted in excess funds with the banking system as credit delivery started sinking due to the crisis. Banks started parking these excess funds with RBI at policy reverse repo rate. The liquidity infusion helped the market to increase their participation in bond market as interest rate started dipping due to infusion of huge liquidity to the system coupled with reduction in policy rates and drop in credit delivery. The liquidity infusion also helps banking system to invest in bonds thereby increasing the bond turnover in the market. Since mid-2010, Indian market is going through a tight liquidity condition for which RBI has been injecting liquidity through LAF repo window and occasional OMO. The proactive policy initiatives were taken by RBI to avoid contraction of the RBI balance sheet and the same aimed at ensuring non-inflationary growth of money supply in the economy to support the needs of the real economy. This resulted in stabilizing the bond turnover. 
Trading Activity
Though there are large numbers of securities (there are 110 securities including special securities but excluding floating rate bonds as on March'13) extending maturity upto 30 years issued by the Government and available for trading in the market, trading is concentrated on few securities.
Indian Government bond market faces high concentration in benchmark securities like 10-year and 5-year maturities. Though there are large number of securities issued by the Government, trading in 10 securities constitute about 95% of the trading in terms of value. Hence most of the securities are relatively illiquid. Trading level in the market is also sensitive to the net LAF level.
The correlation between Net LAF and Trading volume is -0.39. There is liquidity concentration in few securities like 10-year benchmark. The concentration of liquidity in few securities has increased in recent years. Trading concentration in benchmark securities has been hallmark of the Indian Government securities market. After the financial crisis, market interest in long term bonds have come down significantly. 
Liquidity Measurement and Determinants
Turnover Ratio
Bond Market liquidity can be measured by Bonds Turnover Ratio (TR). The ratio shows the extent of daily trading volume in the secondary market (buy and sell) relative to the amount of bonds outstanding measured in terms of Face Value. This ratio is computed for securities using only outright purchases / sales and excludes repo / repurchases transactions. A secondary market is said to be active when the TR is high. The Pearson Correlation (after Fisher's z transformation) between Yield and TR works out to be Graphically they follow a close trend. During financial crisis, there was substantial drop in TR.
In order to understand the true relation between TR and Yield, we fitted a simple model using the TR and Yield (monthly changes). The regression R-sq was 0.19. The linearly fitted model
showed that Yield and TR have statistically significant relationship. We re-specified the model with inclusion of the lagged yields as additional variables and found that the R-sq improved to 0.38. Since most of the time series data has an autoregressive structure, we re-specified the regression model with inclusion of lagged variables of the TR in the equation upto 5 lags 18 along with the yields and lagged yields.
= + 1 * 1 + 2 * 2 + 1 * 1 + 2 * 2 + 3 * 3 + 4 * 4 + 5 * 5 + The estimated equation shows that TR has a long memory and it gets influenced by lagged values of TR upto 4 months though lag 3 and 4 are week and statistically significant only at 5%
level. It also showed that lagged yield is not statistically significant. We re-estimated the model with these lagged variables (OLS). The signs of the estimated equation show clearly that change in liquidity measured by TR is negatively related to the level of Yield and positively to previous months' TR. We also tried to re-estimate the model with an autoregressive process using only 4 lagged values of TR and DY. relationship with its own lagged information but has an instantaneous relationship with the yield.
Amihud Illiquidity Indicator
Amihud (2002) measured illiquidity of the stock using a measure called ILLIQ which is the daily ratio of absolute price change to its value traded. This is interpreted as the daily price response linked to trading value. This ratio works as a good measure for estimating price impact. There are other measures of liquidity but some of such measures will require high frequency microstructure data (e.g. for calculating bid-ask spread). The measure proposed by Amihud can be easily constructed with usual available data of daily prices for a longer period to test the effects over time of illiquidity on ex-ante and contemporaneous bond returns. This illiquidity measure can be linked with other simple measures of illiquidity. Amihud found that both across stocks and over time (for NYSE during 1964 (for NYSE during -1997 , expected returns are an increasing function of expected liquidity. He found that ILLIQ has a positive and highly significant effect on expected returns. He found that higher realized illiquidity raises expected illiquidity that in turn raises expected returns.
Following Amihud, bond illiquidity is defined in this paper as the ratio of daily absolute return to the trading value on that day. Daily absolute return is calculated by taking the difference between closing price and opening price of the bonds. Since there are two distinct platforms for doing and/or recording a transaction in India, NDS-OM platform dominates with large market share.
Though same security can be traded either in OTC market and gets reported in NDS system or it can be anonymously traded in NDS-OM system, it is necessary to adjust the scale factor (trading multiple) in ILLIQ ratio computed for NDS system vis-à-vis NDS-OM system. Since NDS-OM market is visible to all traders in the market on almost real time basis, deals in OTC market may be executed by dealers after comparing the price/yield in NDS-OM system. In order to have better understanding of the liquidity dynamics in Indian Government securities market, we divided the securities into three categories in terms of their number of deals in a day. If the number of deals exceeds 15 in a day, it is considered as "Liquid", if the number of deals exceeds 5, then it is considered as "Semi-Liquid", otherwise "Illiquid". We dropped all trades where High and Low prices are same -all deals are considered as "special" and might have taken place at the same price. These deals may be the ones which are executed by the same dealers (at least in one side of the deal) and hence executed at a single price. We constituted our dataset with securities that have at least 3 trades in a day and dropped all non-market lot deals (below 50million). However, the Amihud ILLIQ ratio that was computed for NDS are scaled (adjusted) using the trading value ratio (the ratio of value of deals in NDS-OM and NDS). This scaling is absolutely necessary to make them comparable in terms of their liquidity parameters. After scaling the ILLIQ ratio, both NDS and NDS-OM became comparable for analysis. It is observed that the scaling factor is less than 1 for semi-liquid and illiquid securities while for liquid securities, the scaling factor is greater than one and very high. The Amihud ratio has been multiplied by 10^7 for reporting results. This scaling factors for illiquid and semi-liquid securities show that market participants prefer OTC market to negotiate the deals rather than going for the anonymous order driven market for these securities. NDS-OM has helped to create an efficient market for liquid securities with much finer pricing but for illiquid and semi-liquid securities, the dealers and their constituents must know the counter-parties who may be willing to trade a security.
Once we constructed the daily Amihud ILLIQ factor for all securities for our dataset consisting shows a significant drop. The Amihud ILLIQ indicator was aggregated for month specific analysis. The data very clearly indicates that the Amihud ILLIQ was very high during financial crisis period and soon after as liquidity dried up. However, the liquidity has improved considerably in recent months.
Amihud ILLIQ indicator was very high during financial crisis period indicating increasing illiquidity in the market. Year-wise analysis also indicates the drop in illiquidity after introduction of NDS-OM. As the liquidity improved due to introduction of NDS-OM, this must have resulted in savings for all market participants.
We wanted to test if there was any structural change in liquidity indicator after introduction on NDSOM system and used the Chow test for testing the said information for a data period of 122 months (Jan'03 to Feb'13). The Aug'05 is the 32 nd data point for which structural break is tested.
We included change in yield and the lagged values of Amihud ILLIQ in the equation to test for structural break significance. When we consider all securities, we find that NDS-OM has marginally higher liquidity vis-à-vis NDS system in post-NDSOM era. The transparency in NDS-OM system helped the market participants to have better price discovery in OTC market. However, all the tests showed that there is a statistically significant difference between the mean of the variable Amihud ILLIQ and zero for all groups and it supports the relationship of price impact and liquidity.
Annual average ILLIQ factor was estimated using the daily average ILLIQ for both NDS and 
We did a t-test (independent groups) to understand if the Amihud illiquidity factor is statistically different in their mean for NDS and NDSOM platforms (taking all data). This t-test is designed
to compare means of same variable (Amihud ILLIQ) between two groups -NDS and NDSOM. The p-value for the difference in means between NDS and NDS-OM is more than 0.05 for the entire period, so we conclude that the difference in means is not statistically significantly different from 0. However, for the F-test (two-tailed significance probability), the probability is less than 0.05. So there is evidence that the variances for the two groups, NDS and NDSOM, are different. Therefore, we report Satterthwaite variance estimator for the t-test.
Satterthwaite is an alternative to the pooled-variance t-test and is used when the assumption that the two populations have equal variances seems unreasonable. It provides a t-statistic that asymptotically approaches a t distribution, allowing for an approximate t-test to be calculated when the population variances are not equal.
The same t-test was extended to year-wise analysis. We did the same set of tests with Amihud ILLIQ taking into account only Government securities and dropping T-Bills and other securities. The results are significantly different from the earlier one (with all securities). When we considered only dated Government securities, we find that for full period, the t-stat is significant at 1%. The p-value for the difference between NDS and NDS-OM is less than 0.05 for the entire period, so we conclude that the difference in means is statistically significantly different from 0. For the F-test (two-tailed significance probability), the probability is less than 0.05. So there is evidence that the variances for the two groups, NDS and NDSOM, are different. The same t-test was extended to year-wise analysis. As we have divided our trades into three different groups -liquid, semi-liquid and illiquid, we wanted to test if there is any difference in liquidity for the same group of securities in different platforms. We considered all securities for the analysis while calculating the Amihud ILLIQ factor. Pre-NDSOM era had remarkably higher illiquidity. A graphical representation of the data clearly shows that OTC deals reported to NDS platform has higher level of illiquidity for stocks classified as "Liquid" vis-à-vis securities classified as "Illiquid" or "Semi-liquid" 22 .
We conducted similar analysis for dated Government securities and dropped all T-Bills, special and State securities. A graphical representation of the data clearly shows that OTC deals in dated Government securities reported to NDS platform has higher level of illiquidity for stocks classified as "Liquid" vis-à-vis securities classified as "Illiquid" or "Semi-liquid".
We estimated daily Amihud ILLIQ factor by taking only liquid securities into account. The result shows that the Amihud illiquidity factor is very low for liquid securities in NDS-OM platform. Table - It has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that NDS-OM has improved liquidity in the market and specifically, the on-the-run Government securities has very low Amihud ILLIQ factor.
However, for illiquid and semi-liquid securities, NDS reporting platform provides higher level of liquidity vis-à-vis NDS-OM.
Liquidity is generally a function of yield -high yield will force traders to avoid selling off their stocks and low yield will enthuse buyers to procure the stock. Change in Yield has an impact on liquidity measured by TR and Amihud ILLIQ. For this purpose, we only considered the data from Aug'05 to Feb'13 from NDS-OM system. As the NDS-OM system had anonymous order book system with exact time stamp, it was easy to record opening and closing price of the trades. The signs of the estimated equation show clearly that liquidity measured by ILLIQ is negatively related to Yield. We used yield and the lag values of ILLIQ assuming that illiquidity of today has its root in the past -past illiquidity might affect present liquidity. We found that only first two lags of ILLIQ is statistically significant while other lags are not. This implies the illiquidity has a short memory.
Impact Cost
Impact Cost (IC) is another important measure of liquidity in the financial market where trading happens through an order book mechanism. In Indian Government bond market, NDS-OM provides the order book for securities trading in the system. Using the order book, we estimated impact cost for executing standard 250million (FV) 24 worth of bond for both buy and sell side positions separately. IC is estimated for 5 most liquid bonds at every 30 minutes interval. We ignored semi-liquid and illiquid securities as it was difficult to get the orders filled for the required standard value. For some bonds on some days for some time intervals, the order book was not filled for standard execution and the hence IC was not estimated for that time slot for the security on that day. At the end of the day, IC was averaged for both bid and offer side separately portfolio. However, the difference in the spread is not substantially large. The average IC in different periods -between 9.00AM and 12.30PM (Pre-Midday) and between 1.00PM and 5.00PM (Post-Midday) show some variation. Typically IC in Post-Midday is higher than the Pre-Midday. As markets are very active in the morning, the market makers may possibly be demanding higher cost for executing deals.
The difference between Bid IC and Offer IC represent the spread. The spread is generally positive as Bid IC has been generally higher than the Offer IC. The Bid IC was higher in about 69% of the days (1569 days between 03- Aug-2006 and 30-Apr-2013) . In case of Pre-Midday sessions, Bid IC was higher in case of 91% instances while in Post-Midday, the same was higher for about 75% of instances. The variability of the spreads is stable except during the financial crisis period. However, the pre-Midday spread is generally higher in comparison to the post-midday spread.
We looked at a linear equation to understand the dependence of yield on impact cost. We did not find any significant relationship between them. However, we found that lagged values of Impact cost changes have some influence in the current impact cost.
Price Volatility structure
In order to understand the price volatility structure of the Government securities market, we analysed trading data from April 1999 to Feb 2013 (167 months of trade information). Two important market microstructure changes took place during these years-setting up a clearing and settlement system in Feb'02 and starting of an order driven trading system for Government debt in Aug'05. The volatility indicator has been computed as a ratio of price range and trade value for individual stocks on daily basis with the condition that the stock has at least 3 trades in a day.
In some cases, we found that all trades have been executed at the same price in the OTC market and hence we dropped these trades assuming that it is likely that two traders might have agreed to deal at a particular price in an OTC market for specific reason and might have unbundled the deals into various lots as per their operational flexibility. The data shows that volatility indicator was higher before the introduction of structured clearing and settlement systems as well as before the introduction of NDSOM system in Government securities market. The same came down and became more stable afterwards. The volatility indicator was high during the financial crisis period (identified with RBI's action for softening or hardening policy rates) but in recent months the same has been substantially lower.
An order driven system might have helped in reducing the volatility in the market because of its transparency level. Given the order book system and anonymous trade matching provisions coupled with straight through processing capabilities, the NDSOM could be used by the traders to execute deals with each other. Hence the new system could have brought some significant change to the entire environment. In order to understand the role of NDSOM system in volatility spectrum, we used a dummy variable for testing the same.
The equation estimated is = + * −1 + * 1 + * 2 + The volatility indicator in period t depends on the volatility indicator of period t-1 (we tried with other lags but found them to be not statistically significant). The dummy variables used became significant at 1% indicating that introduction of NDSOM system has an impact on volatility. As the sign is negative, the relation is inverse -the volatility indicator has come down after the introduction of NDSOM system; other dummy variable has the positive sign meaning that the higher volatility indicator was due to financial crisis.
There seems to be a structural break in 2005 as the volatility structure is changing towards a lower level. This structural break is possibly due to introduction of NDSOM system in Indian Government securities market. In order to understand if there is a structural break in the volatility structure represented by volatility indicator after introduction of NDSOM, we conducted a Chow test for the said dataset. We also included lagged values of volatilities in the regression model. The Chow test clearly accepts the hypothesis that there was a structural break in volatility structure after introduction of NDS-OM 
Concluding Remarks
The study finds that Turnover Ratio and Amihud Illiquidity indicator are important market liquidity indicators for Indian sovereign bond market. Though, impact cost is used as an indicator for liquidity, the same does not have an explanatory relationship with yield. It has been found that NDS-OM system has helped in improving liquidity in the system substantially. It has also helped in reducing volatility in the market to a large extent.
